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Abstract
In recent years, models for co-creating value in a business-to-business context have
often been examined with the aim of studying the strategies implemented by and
among organisations for competitive and co-operative purposes. The traditional
concepts of competition and co-operation between businesses have now evolved,
both in terms of the sector in which the businesses operate and in terms of the type
of goods they produce.
Many researchers have, in recent times, investigated the determinants that can
influence the way in which the model of co-opetition can be applied to the football
world. Research interest lies in the particular features of what makes a good football.
In this paper, the aim is to conduct an analysis of the rules governing the “football
system”, while also looking at the determinants of the demand function within
football entertainment. This entails applying to football match management the
co-opetition model, a recognised model that combines competition and co-operation
with the view of creating and distributing value. It can, therefore, be said that, for a
spectator, watching sport is an experience of high suspense, and this suspense, in turn,
depends upon the degree of uncertainty in the outcome. It follows that the rules
ensuring that both these elements can be satisfied are a fertile ground for co-operation
between clubs, as it is in the interest of all stakeholders to offer increasingly more
attractive football, in comparison with other competing products. Our end purpose is
to understand how co-opetition can be achieved within professional football.
Background
Introduction
In the post-industrial, knowledge-based economy of today’s more developed nations,
companies vary in their perspective of what constitutes value for business (Chase 1997;
Del Giudice and Maggioni 2014).
Over recent years, models for co-creating value in a business-to-business context
have often been examined with the purpose of studying the strategies implemented by
and among organisations for competitive and co-operative purposes.
The traditional concepts of competition and co-operation between businesses have
now evolved, both in terms of the sector in which the businesses operate and in terms
of the type of goods they produce.
With the introduction of the concept of co-opetition (Cherington 1976; Brandenburger
and Nalebuff 1996), scholars have tried to identify a theory that can go beyond the simple
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conventional approach at the basis of the working relationship between companies oper-
ating in the same sector.
The term co-opetition is used to explain the simultaneous relationships that foment
co-operation and competition between companies and which are the result of the com-
plexity of the interests and objectives involved.
Over the years, this topic has been investigated from a number of perspectives. Several
scholars have analysed how the co-opetition model has been applied in different indus-
tries and why it is used as a business strategy (Stein 2010; Kylänen and Rusko 2011).
According to our research, however, very few studies look at how the co-opetition
model can be applied to the field of professional sport.
Up to now, research on professional sport has focused mainly on the various co-
opetition strategies and associated benefits (Stewart et al. 2005; Robert et al. 2009;
Lorgnier and Su 2014). However, very few studies examine the methods used to imple-
ment these strategies or the workings of the co-opetition model.
Accordingly, the objective of this paper is to study how the sector of professional
football operates, analysing its governance from a co-opetition perspective in order to
identify the tools used for implementing this model.
Interest in this research came about because of the particular features of football and,
specifically, to its experiential properties and the importance, from the point of view of
enjoyment, of its subjective dimension in the form of relationships and its objective di-
mension in the form of uncertainty in match results. The ingredients necessary to keep
competition alive in the sector of professional football are, in fact, the passionate in-
volvement of football supporters and the uncertainty of the outcome. It is clear, there-
fore, that these elements depend on pride in the competition and unceasing rivalry
between the teams competing in a tournament.
In the light of the above, in order to plug the previously identified gap in literature,
the research question of this paper is the following:
RQ1: What tools can be used to apply co-opetition to professional football?
In order to answer the research question, the paper is structured in the following
way. After the introduction, the “Background” section includes also the literature re-
view with particular reference to the role of co-opetition in professional sport. The sec-
ond section contains the description of the methodology, considering the theoretical
framework of reference and the context in which the research was carried out. The
process in which co-opetition is applied to professional football is described in the third
section. In the fourth, the discussion is presented, together with the implications deriv-
ing from the research. The fifth section contains the conclusions, the limitations of the
study and the possible directions of future research.
Literature review
The concept of co-opetition was introduced for the first time in literature by Cherington
(1976). However, it was only in 1996 that Brandenburger and Nalebuff brought the topic
into public discussion and research with their book Co-opetition (Brandenburger and
Nalebuff 1996).
According to Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996), co-opetition is a revolutionary
philosophy that combines competition and co-operation with the view of creating
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value. Value is generated through a co-operative process, capturing part of the value
created through the competitive process.
In traditionally used competitive models, the general rule is to maximise profit and
the way it is distributed. In co-operative models, all the players in a given sector consti-
tute a systemic network for generating value. Each player acts as the complementor of
the others, in the sense that all the business relationships between the players are based
on complementarity.
Among other things, a co-opetition relationship can be founded on shared rules. Ac-
cording to Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996), these rules can be either formal or infor-
mal. Formal rules are official and governmental, while informal rules are cultural in origin
or are the effects of an agreement between the parties involved. Governmental and cul-
tural rules are called “metarules” by the authors, since they are fixed from the outside, al-
though lawmaking can be influenced through lobbying the various bodies involved.
Generally, it is thought that, through co-opetition, companies can increase their powers
of innovation (Quintana-García and Benavides-Velasco 2004; Cherubini and Pattuglia,
2009; Soto-Acosta et al. 2015) and, as a consequence, their performance, especially through
the trust-based relationships established among the network members (Carayannis and
Campbell 2006; Dagnino and Rocco 2009; Trequattrini et al. 2012; Campanella et al. 2013).
Over the years, the concept of co-opetition has been examined from many angles
(Stein 2010). One thread concerns the studies that look in detail at the theoretical basis
of the relationships established between the many interested players. Another thread
consists in the works where scholars have tried to present concrete evidence of co-
opetition by analysing cases involving a number of sectors.
Dagnino and Padula (2002) stated that there is the presumption of inter-dependence
among the members of a network having the purpose of implementing co-opetition
strategies, as this is a source for creating and distributing value. Inter-dependence can
be at the basis of benefits for the partners, which are mutual but not necessarily equal
because of the various kinds of pressure that can compromise this co-operation. It is
also the basis for convergence of interests among several companies.
Zineldin (2004) has pointed out that the fundamental conditions for building a rela-
tionship founded on co-opetition are similar to a wedding. All participants must know
each other, take part in the ceremony and sign the contract tying them together. Poten-
tial conflicts must be mended through transparent and shared agreements. All partici-
pants must be fully aware that divorce is always possible.
Luo (2004) defined co-opetition as a system in which all agents retain a certain level
of inter-dependence without losing their organisational autonomy, and has applied it to
international companies, starting from the assumption that increased competitive pres-
sure is at the basis of the need for greater co-operation among multinationals. He has
investigated co-opetition among global rivals, co-opetition among foreign governments
and co-opetition within one multinational enterprise.
Gnywali et al. (2006) studied the relationship between the advantages and disadvan-
tages of co-opetition in the context of how a company is positioned within a network.
According to the author, the most closely linked companies are those most capable of
influencing the network, while still retaining a high degree of autonomy.
In their analysis, Bakshi and Kleindorfer (2009) established the superiority of co-
opetition over competition in relation to managing supply chain security because co-
Lardo et al. Journal of Innovation and Entrepreneurship  (2016) 5:1 Page 3 of 15
operative contracts lead to investments being made in terms of security, in contrast
with non-co-operative agreements.
A number of studies have been concerned with case-based papers at country, indus-
try and company levels, which deal with critical issues relating to the management of
co-opetition in different world arenas (Stein 2010; Kylänen and Rusko 2011).
Bojar and Drelichowski (2008) investigated the development of companies operating
in the agricultural industry in many EU member countries. Despite the fact that agri-
cultural companies are competitors, they have a number of common interests, such as
building up the necessary infrastructure for large-scale production, the general develop-
ment of rural areas and, linked to this, obtaining EU financial support. One feature of
the co-opetition approach is that it helps to increase the power of the members’ com-
bined market compared to that of their competitors not taking part and in terms of
their dealings with their customers.
Thematically, this paper is close to that of Song (2003), in which he explains that the
importance of co-opetition in the port and docks industry is due to the efforts made
over the preceding decade to introduce rationalising measures. Many port operators
who previously had only managed their local operation have then extended their busi-
ness to a regional or global scale.
Eriksson (2008), on analysing the Swedish construction industry, recognised that, be-
cause of the lack of confidence in co-operative action among contract partners, there is
difficulty in applying co-opetition models. He argued that mistrust prevents co-operation
for taking place according to the expectations set out in transaction cost theory. His aim
was to demonstrate that companies can make unbiased and systematic procurement deci-
sions (Lombardi et al. 2014a).
Considering the information technology industry, Gueguen (2009) studied co-
operative behaviour among companies, showing the importance of setting technological
standards and, therefore, the need for competitors to co-operate (Del Giudice et al.
2012; Palacios-Marqués et al. 2015).
In the sports sector, several studies have highlighted that league member clubs, in the
course of a season, can simultaneously implement strategies of collaboration and of
competition.
Robert et al. (2009) stated that football clubs gain financial benefits from the col-
lective negotiation of some resources and suggest that there are three types of pro-
fessional football clubs. These are the efficient (they rarely buy or sell players and
use co-opetition strategies sparingly), the merchandisers (they strongly benefit from
merchandising) and the co-opetitors (they earn great sums and have access to top
players) (Lombardi et al. 2014b). This study also emphasises the role that football
leagues have in optimising primary management resources, such as, for example,
television rights.
Vernhet et al. (2011) have pointed out that strategies of co-opetition can be imple-
mented through the mediation of leagues, which act as club intermediaries.
Although, in literature, adequate prominence has been given to the role of the gov-
ernance bodies within the “football system”, in very few studies has it been underlined
that these bodies can act as tools used by clubs to develop co-opetition mechanisms,
under the initial assumption that clubs take part, directly or indirectly, in elaborating
the set of rules concerning the management of professional football.
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In this paper, the objective is to fill this gap in literature, drawing attention to the co-
opetition logics at the basis of rules introduced to regulate the game and those that
govern the clubs’ administrative side.
Methods
Framework
The study was carried out using an in-depth qualitative approach, consistent with our
exploratory and descriptive aim (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Huberman and Miles 2002;
Eisenhardt 1989).
This article is based on the theoretical framework proposed by Neale (1964), ac-
cording to whom, the professional sports offer is, in fact, a combined product, in the
sense that it is realised through the contribution of several parties. In this prospective,
the stronger the competitor, the greater the gain of each participant in the competi-
tion, with this gain being strictly linked to the interest that the competition can excite
in the spectators.
This idea can lead to the conclusion that sport is a sector in which the traditional
principles of economy do not hold true, having considered that, for each individual
player, achieving a position of absolute prominence is less advantageous than that po-
tentially possible in a situation of perfect competition.
In order to place sport within the precepts of traditional economy, Neale distin-
guishes between economic and sporting competition. While clubs compete individually
in a sports competition, this does not take place within an economic framework in
which no one team can satisfy the overall market demand on its own. If this were the
case, there would be no competitors for teams to match themselves against and the
game would have no meaning.
The research uses secondary sources (Yin 2003) and includes documents, reports,
news items, journal articles in open sources, papers, scientific books and databases.
Context of the research
This article is based on a study of the football sector, starting from the hypothesis that
the objective of professional football club managers is to entertain the spectators, while
trying, where possible, to win the games they play.
The ingredients necessary for keeping the competition alive are interest, uncertainty
and passionate engagement in chasing results. On close examination, these elements
demand pride in the competition and incessant rivalry between the teams taking part
in the tournaments.
It is clear that, if the rivals are not good enough, there is no uncertainty or engage-
ment in the result and this, in turn, means that supporters do not feel the need to iden-
tify themselves with their clubs or to proclaim their sense of belonging to them. A
predictable championship where the same team always wins would lose its main at-
tractiveness and reduce, at least on a temporary basis, spectator interest, which is a
major source of economic value for sports entertainment.
These are considerations that clearly show the great difference between sports com-
petition and competition in any economic sector. In sport, the aim is not to eliminate
the weakest rival, since no team can do without the others and, in general, there is the
feeling that a certain balance is essential to the competition.
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The idea of a type of competition where company strategy is such that competitive
and co-operative behaviour can co-exist has already been expressed theoretically and is
embedded in the concept of co-opetition.
Professional football is a typical sector in which the co-opetition model dominates.
Winning the European Champions League does not merely benefit the winning club,
but all the clubs in the same national league, since with this result the nation’s ranking
increases, meaning that more clubs can take part in the European championship the
following year.
Furthermore, differently to what happens in other economic sectors, competitors are
induced to develop and maintain collaborative agreements, not only in terms of orga-
nising better tournaments but also exploring new sources of income and exchanging
ideas concerning best practice.
Results
Competition and co-operation in the sector of professional football must be kept within
precise boundaries set by the sports’ values and the rules of behaviour that should re-
flect these values.
It follows that, in the sector of professional football, the co-opetition model operates
through tools that typically take the form of the rules governing the behaviour of the
operators in the sector. These rules, basically, have the task of creating the correct bal-
ance between competition and co-operation.
From the viewpoint of co-operation, the rules put in place to protect competitive bal-
ance are extremely important. In general lines, these can be divided into rules that
regulate the game and rules that oversee the administrative workings of the clubs.
Typical examples of rules belonging to the first category are the arrangements con-
cerning the function of the referees.
This role became indispensible when the first football game regulations were intro-
duced by the English Football Association in 1863. At that point, two officials were
given the task of ensuring that the rules were respected, one nominated by each team
playing. These umpires had no authority to stop the game, but the players could ask
them to arbitrate over the interpretation of any action. Since the two officials almost
never agreed, there was clearly the need for a third, neutral, official, who could be re-
ferred to (referee) over any dispute and was nominated in common agreement between
the two clubs.
In 1891, the Football Association decided that the referees would become to sole
judges of the correct proceedings of a match. They were given the discretionary power
to punish faults in the game with free kicks and, for the first time, had the right to be
on the pitch with the players. The two officials nominated by the teams become assist-
ant referees and were placed along the touchlines.
While football had evolved enormously in terms of rules and tactics, the function of
the referee and assistant referees has remained basically the same over the years, and
their slowly acquired independence—economic and otherwise—has not made them im-
mune from criticism and accusations of favouritism.
Economic theory explains the relationship between the referee and football teams
through the agency model theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Football teams take on
the role of principles, who give the agents (the referees) the task of ensuring that rules
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are respected. It follows that tools can be applied to prevent opportunistic behaviour
on the part of the agents, in the form of incentives. These incentives can be used to
align the objectives of the principles with those of the agent. This consideration is at
the root of the decision taken by England in 2002, and subsequently by other European
countries, to make the role of a referee a professional one.
Despite this drive to increase their professionalism, referees still are the subject of
heavy criticism, where the theoretical matrix, excluding obvious clichés, can be traced
back to the idea put forward by several economists (Akerlof 1980; Becker and Murphy
2000; Bernheim 1994) who believe that environmental conditions can influence the be-
haviour of individuals.
In order to limit the possibility that the external environment and/or certain psycho-
logical attitudes can influence, whether consciously or unconsciously, the way referees
act, thereby allowing them to make systematic errors, proposals have been set forth
from various sides concerning the use of technological tools to improve referee
performance.
These proposals are based on the hypothesis that technology can reduce error, avoid-
ing the situation whereby any individual match can be affected by incorrect decisions
taken by the referee.
According to one part of the concept, using technological tools could risk increasing
rather than reducing imbalance in matches.
Starting from the assumption that the errors made by referees are impartial, it can be
shown (Groot 2008) that stronger rather than weaker teams would benefit most if these
causal errors were not made, and this would load the competitive imbalance. In other
words, a referee who makes an impartial, therefore causal, mistake will in fact help the
weaker teams, resulting in a more balanced competition.
Other game-related rules that can influence the competitive balance concern the or-
ganisation of championships.
According to a study carried out by Cairns (1987), by reducing the number of teams
challenging for a championship, this should increase uncertainty and ensure more uni-
formity in quality among the competing teams. Each additional match increases the
proceeds made by the stronger teams more than proportionally compared to the in-
crease in proceeds made by the weaker teams.
In other research (Hoehn and Szymanski 1999), it has been highlighted that, with the
introduction of the Champions League, where participation is restricted to the best
placed teams in every national league, there is the risk of reducing the competitive bal-
ance of national championships because of the fat profits made by the teams that com-
pete as a club in the most important European competition.
Looking at the rules relating to the administrative workings of a club that could in-
crease competitive balance, revenue sharing is probably the most important. This is, ba-
sically, a mechanism for redistributing among all clubs any kind of revenue obtained by
the clubs individually or by the league as a whole.
In recent years, the topic of revenue sharing has been at the centre of a fiery debate
concerning the methods of dealing with television rights from watching football in each
country (Parlasca 2006). The confrontation is between, on the one side, those support-
ing a decentralised system where all sports clubs have individual contracts with media
networks covering television-and-radio rights for home matches and, on the other,
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those supporting a centralised system in which each league in every country negotiates
with the networks on behalf of all the championship matches, which involves splitting
the revenue among the teams according to a specific distribution model.
In particular, those in favour of the latter system set out, as their principle argument
backing this collective sale, the idea that centralised control over television rights and
the distribution of revenue would ensure sufficient balance among the teams, since this
balance is seen as the main means for keeping up the interest of football supporters.
The centralised model had been in place for several years in England. According to
this model, 50 % of the revenue is distributed equally, 25 % consists in merit payment
(which depends upon where a club finishes in the league table) and 25 % in facility fees
(paid according to how many times a club’s matches are shown on UK television). In
Italy, the model was only introduced recently and revenue is split according to the fol-
lowing allocation scheme:
– 40 % equally among all top division (Serie A) teams.
– 30 % based on results and, of this, 10 % based on results achieved since 1946.
– The remaining 30 % is split according to supporter pool size, with 25 % based on
the number of supporters for each team in the championship and 5 % calculated on
the basis of the population of the club’s home town.
While the main European countries are in general moving towards a centralised
model, the theoretic debate about the efficiency of revenue sharing in achieving the ob-
jective of increasing competitive balance is still basically open.
For a long time, economic literature (Quirk and El-Hodiri 1974; Fort and Quirk 1995;
Vrooman 1995) on the subject has been dominated by what is known as the “invariance
principle”, according to which, revenue sharing has no impact on competitive balance.
According to Késenne (2007), the influence of revenue sharing on the competitive bal-
ance of the clubs changes depending on the model used to interpret it. In the hypothesis,
for example, of an objective function that coincides with maximising the wins, revenue
sharing always leads to greater competitive advantage, since poorer clubs can appropriate
part of the revenue of richer teams and invest it to acquire several more talented players.
At the same time, Dobson and Goddard (2004) state that, where clubs act to maximise
profit, the impact of revenue sharing will basically be zero (invariance principle) in a closed
championship, with no promotions or relegations. In the hypothesis of an open champion-
ship, the impact of redistribution of revenue is not predictable and can even be negative.
This counter-intuitive conclusion is based on the idea presented by Szymanski and
Késenne (2004), according to whom investment in talent is at the basis of wins, and
these, in turn, are the premises for new revenue. When revenue is distributed, winning
clubs can only gain part of the revenue they produced through their investments, and
so they will tend to reduce their investment in new talented players. At the same time,
losing clubs will gain part of the revenue that was due to the winning clubs, with the
consequence that these weaker clubs will have little or no incentive to invest in new tal-
ent, since they can rely on part of the revenue which they were not responsible for
producing.
It follows that the final outcome depends on the relationship between the weaker
clubs’ disincentive to buy new talented players and the richer clubs’ disincentive to
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invest. If the former prevails on the latter, the overall result will be an increase in com-
petitive imbalance. If the opposite is true, there will be in increase in competitive ad-
vantage. If the effects are balanced, the final result will be substantially zero, once more
revealing the principle of invariance.
Feess and Stähler (2009) disagree with the above conclusions, stating that the model
is based on the incomplete hypothesis that revenue increases in function of the relative
quality of the clubs measured through the probability of winning. The authors propose,
otherwise, a model where the football clubs’ revenues depend, apart from on relative
quality, also on absolute quality and the balance of competition. In this context, rev-
enue sharing increases competitive balance if, with all other factors being equal, the
clubs differ exclusively in terms of the impact of absolute quality on revenue. On
the contrary, revenue sharing will have a negative impact on the balance of a com-
petition if the hypothesis is that only relative quality plays a decisive role in incre-
menting revenue.
Among the rules that, over recent years, have had a major impact on the football sys-
tem is the branch of studies covering the subject of access to national and international
tournaments.
With the objective of growing the European football system from an organisational
and management perspective and to ensure that tournaments are fair, including eco-
nomically and financially, as from the season 2004–2005, only clubs in possession of a
“UEFA Licence” can take part in European competitions.
To be issued a UEFA Licence, clubs must satisfy a number of requirements covering
the sport and infrastructure and of a legal and economic-financial nature. The rules
covering economic and financial matters are normally known as “financial fair play reg-
ulations”. The main aim of these regulations is to provide greater assurance regarding
the operational stability of clubs taking part in European competitions and to
strengthen the process of promoting a management culture in the football world.
On the basis of the complex system of rules set out in the financial fair play regula-
tions, clubs must show that they are viable as an ongoing concern, that there are no
overdue debts towards their staff, the tax authorities or other football clubs and that
they are able to match their costs with their operating income for the period.
The UEFA Club Financial Control Body was established to ensure that the financial
fair play regulations are fully respected. This is a survey unit that is involved in the pre-
liminary phase of the process and a judging unit that must take the final decisions.
In March 2012, sanctions were announced for potential non-fulfilment of the above,
without, however, specifying what penalties would apply to which offences. The main
sanctions that can be given include fines, loss of points, limiting the number of foot-
ballers who can play, disqualification from the current championship and exclusion
from future championships.
Discussion
In this work, we followed a logical scheme that can be summarised below (Fig. 1):
We started from the definition of co-opetition and the theoretical framework of refer-
ence elaborated by Neale, according to whom, in the sports industry, it is necessary to
distinguish between economic and sports competition. In a tournament, clubs compete
between each other to gain the best possible result. In an economic competition, where
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no team can individually satisfy the entire market demand, the football “product” rea-
lised by the clubs competes with any other product in the field of entertainment.
In this perspective, the rules are functional if two main objectives can be achieved.
These are, on the one side, to ensure a high level of entertainment by maintaining a
high competitive balance and, on the other, to ensure fair play in tournaments and so
create a loyal following of clients for the product.
Within the paper, the rules are divided into two categories: administrative rules and
rules of play.
While both fall into the category of administrative-type rules, regulations concerning
the distribution of revenue do not have the same objective as those relating to “finan-
cial fair play”. The former are in place to maintain competitive balance, the latter to en-
sure that tournaments can take place regularly and on a fair basis, avoiding the
possibility that financial difficulties of individual clubs can reflect on the organisation of
tournaments.
Among the regulations governing the workings of the game are the rules to improve
refereeing and those overseeing the organisation of championships. From these regula-
tions, it can be seen that, while the final aim is to ensure fair play in competition, there
are repercussions on competitive balance. It has been shown that the introduction of
technological tools can affect competitive balance indirectly, as does reducing the num-
ber of teams playing in a tournament, whether it is open or closed.
This consideration is seen to be important when looking at the true nature of the
sports product, which is different from any other entertainment-type product.
It is well-known, in first place, that sports entertainment includes the fans or sup-
porters, who will identify themselves with a particular team and would normally never
contemplate turning their back on their favourite team because the results are not good
or the ticket price does not match that of a rival team. The typical behaviour of an un-
happy supporter is to desert the matches and, in the rather exceptional cases when they
adopt a “second” team, go for teams in a different division or different sport. It is,
therefore, possible to state that partisanship and habit are two of the most distinctive fea-
tures in the relationship between supporters and teams and the origin of this support is
often linked, although not always, to the supporters’ place of birth or where they live.
In second place, it should be stressed that a sports event taking place in a stadium in-
volves a wide variety of complementary products (Vrontis et al. 2014), such as food
and drink, betting on the outcome, pre-game and mid-game entertainment, on top of
the intangible product in the form of the atmosphere and the sense of sharing, known
to draw in millions of spectators around the world.
Sports Industry Rules
Operating League 
rules
Co-opetition
Co-operation
Competition
Financial domain
Sports domain
Rules to improve 
refereeing role
Goals
Ensuring a high level of 
performance through 
competitive balance
Ensuring League 
regularity
Administrative 
rules
Revenue sharing Financial Fair Play
Rules governing 
the game
Fig. 1 Research framework
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In third place, it is possible to state that sports entertainment is an experience
involving—more or less—high suspense, which is, in turn, connected to the level of uncer-
tainty in the outcome. While there is a conflicting body of empirical evidence concerning
the impact of uncertainty on the number of spectators who watch a competition or even
a single match (Neale 1964; Forrest and Simmons 2002; Szymanski and Késenne 2004;
Parlasca 2006; Andreff and Raballand 2011), it is widely known that there is a close link
between uncertainty and interest in a sports event.
Because of these features, sports entertainment is very different from any other
form of entertainment, offering at one time the typical human experience of the-
atre and game.
Concerning game-related aspects, it has been observed (Caillois 1961) that, generally
speaking, games can be classed according to which holds most sway among the four el-
ements of competition, fortune, simulation and vertigo.
In this sense, football is a complex game, with, on the one hand, a very strong com-
petitive element (the most talented team wins) and, on the other, a certain element of
fortune that can, in some cases, overturn any prediction.
Since sports entertainment is an experiential resource defined by uncertainty, the op-
timal sports experience is based on the presumption of competitive balance. Indeed, in
a sports context, the optimal experience takes place when there is the right blend be-
tween the level of challenge and the ability of those involved to handle the challenge.
The other aspect defining football entertainment is the social feeling of belonging,
that is, that psychological and emotional state whereby football fans feel that they are
part of a group acting for a common result. Although in high-business-intensity sports
these feelings are blurred, the joy of holding a flag and the ensuing feelings of loyalty,
solidarity and belonging are, without doubt, extremely effective as a glue binding club,
team and supporters.
According to the perspective in question, football entertainment is a relational asset,
where the role and intrinsic value of inter-personal relationships play a major part.
In the light of the above, it is possible to affirm that “football entertainment” is an ex-
tremely complex resource and cannot be placed within a single conceptual framework.
The elements that best capture the peculiarities of this type of asset can be traced, on
the one hand, to its experiential side and, on the other, to the importance, in terms of
enjoyment, of the subjective aspect of relationships and the objective aspect of uncer-
tainty in the outcome of the competition.
It follows that rules which ensure that both of the above elements can be
retained are fertile ground for co-operation between clubs because it is in the
interest of all the actors involved to make football entertainment more attractive,
compared to competitive products.
On the other hand, Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996) consider that sharing rules is
one of the aspects on which a co-opetition relationship can be founded. We need to
understand how far professional football clubs contribute towards defining the rules
outlined above. It should be noted that, in the football context, rules belong to the cat-
egory of metarules, since they are set by organisations outside the clubs.
However, it cannot be ignored that clubs are directly involved in the election process
for organisations governing national federations, and these, in turn, constitute the ac-
tive electorate for the governance bodies of international federations.
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In addition, it is clear that larger clubs are capable of influencing the process of defin-
ing the rules through lobbying initiatives and/or by nominating their own representa-
tives to the most important governing bodies.
Differently from what has been stated in other works, it has been made clear in this
study that professional football clubs can influence international federations in their
process of elaborating rules to regulate the sector more effectively through lobbying
than through the mediation of football leagues.
As can be seen in Fig. 2, the case presented in this paper completes the analysis of lit-
erature on co-opetition by highlighting:
1) The role of the specific aspects of the asset produced as the basic condition for
creating systems of co-operation and competition
2) The role of lobbying in creating shared rules when the subject who is setting the
rules does not belong to the network in which the rules are to be applied
Football is a hybrid system, in the sense that football clubs have an indirect role in
setting the rules, being, directly or indirectly, part of those actively voting in and for na-
tional and international federal governance bodies.
Conclusions
In recent years, many scientific papers have been written about the determinants cap-
able of influencing the demand of football entertainment. Among the most widely ana-
lysed variables are ticket price and supporter income (Andreff 1981; Bird 1982), costs
for away games (Forrest et al. 2002), availability of audio-visual means or other media
(Baimbridge et al. 1996), other sports events, club age, percentage of manual and non-
manual workers employed in a town (Dobson and Goddard 1995), the promotion and
relegation system (Simmons 1996), the entertainment level (Andreff and Nys 1986) and
in terms of comfortable and adequate sports infrastructure, home advantage (Forrest
and Simmons 2002) and unemployment rates in a certain geographical area.
No analysis of the regulations governing the football system can ignore the determi-
nants of the demand function of football entertainment, building on the study of the
nature of this resource and the needs that are satisfied by enjoying this kind of
entertainment.
In particular, it has been revealed that football entertainment can be defined as an ex-
periential resource and its enjoyment is linked to the social dimension of relationships
and the objective aspect of uncertainty about the outcome of the competition.
Although some scholars (Andreff and Raballand 2011) have cast doubt on the rela-
tionship between competitive balance and the reason why supporters attend a football
Co-opetition
Improving the 
football event
Improving 
financial 
performance
Competitive 
balance
Football 
model 
governance 
model
Competition
Co-operation 
through 
lobbyng 
activity
Football event as 
a relational asset
Football event as 
an experiential 
asset
Peculiarity of 
the asset
Uncertainty of 
the result
Need for 
shared rules
Need for a high 
level sports 
competition 
Fig. 2 Co-opetition model specifics in professional football
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event, we believe that supporters are still strongly attracted by the intensity of the
drama they are watching, which depends, in great measure, on the level of competition
and the uncertainty of the results: all variables that can be summarised under the con-
cept of “quality of the game”.
It follows that an effective football system governance, in its entirety, cannot exclude
the use of regulatory tools, covering the game of the administrative side of the clubs,
whose purpose is precisely to increase balance in competitions.
The implication is to apply the co-opetition model to the management of football
competitions. This model, as said previously, combines competition and co-operation
with the function of creating and distributing value.
According to this approach, clubs have a central role in elaborating regulations, both
in the name of a process to increase the value created and in consideration of the fact
that, subsequently, they could gain a greater part of this value in virtue of a more in-
tense competition.
In this paper, the objective is to identify the possible ways and means to apply a co-
opetition model, also highlighting the importance of lobbying activity carried out by
professional football clubs.
Future research can be carried out to examine empirically the impact of regulations
already in place on competitive balance and, also, to see whether it makes sense intro-
ducing to football regulations in other professional sports, which relate to technological
tools for helping referees and maximum salary thresholds for athletes.
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